Traditional English-language historiography of the Crimean War suggests that the French army, particularly in its logistics, was superior to that of the British army, especially during the winter of 1854 and 1855. This article will analyse the perception of French army logistics during the Crimean War and the effect they had on British army reforms during the same period.
This favourable perception of French Crimean logistics is primarily drawn from press reports by W. H. Russell, Thomas Chenery, or Lawrence Godkin (and other ‘Special Correspondents’) and from letters home, which combined to give the common soldier a voice on a hitherto unprecedented scale, revealing his daily life, treatment, and living conditions. A ‘media war’ ensued, and the perception of French army logistics became important not only for its (implicit) criticisms of British logistics, but also because the French soldier appeared to be better fed, clothed, and cared for. The perceived failure of the British army and success of the French resulted in a public outcry, demanding army reform. The apparent success of the French was all the more galling as they were the traditional enemy.
The French army had long been viewed by the reform-minded elements of the British army as the measure of the supposed inefficiency of the latter; the French being generally considered professional compared with the ‘amateurishness’ of the British.
The
Napoleon III reorganized and enlarged the
In addition to these were the Administration Officers (
To mid-nineteenth-century military and domestic reformers, which included the Administrative Reform Association (ARA), the idea of centralization was linked to perceptions of efficiency, the simplification of structure, and economies eliminating costly duplication. It therefore appealed to many Members of Parliament.
While it united the civil branches of the army into one organization, the
Another misapprehension of the British was that the
their Commissary-General is a
Sir Charles Trevelyan too, in his evidence before a Select Committee, asserted that the
The British commissariat was even thought by its own officers to be ‘an extraneous branch’ of the army rather than an ‘integral and vital part […] in immediate and close connection’ (Royal Warrant, p. 9). The operational organization of the
The overall impression created from official reports into the commissariat and transport arrangements, combined with a rose-tinted perception of the French system, was one of French success and professionalism compared to the incompetence of the British system, a belief that would endure until the collapse of the French military machine in 1870 and 1871.
Yet French officers did not share this admiration of the
During the entire campaign, the
The friction created was often compounded by many
The fact that the failure of the French
we are neither constituted, nor in a state to make war […]. We cannot make war without bread, without shoes, without camp kettles, without mess-tins […]. I beg Your Majesty’s pardon for these details, but they prove to the Emperor the difficulties which besiege an army thrown six hundred leagues from its resources.
This was after weeks of repeated letters to the French War Ministry who merely wrote back to the maréchal telling him he must have been ‘wrongly informed’; any deficiencies at the front were strenuously denied in the national media.
Not all British officers commended the
The French
From 29 February 1852, the
The Imperial Guard had its own parallel organization, the
To army reformers in Britain, the French
Some British observers, including Commissary General Filder, exculpated themselves by claiming the French had requisitioned all the usable horses and wagons in Turkey and Bulgaria, ‘selfishly’ leaving none for the British.
In late 1854 the Duke of Newcastle announced the formation of a ‘land transport system quite new to the English service’, the Land Transport Corps receiving its Royal Warrant on 24 January 1855 (Sweetman,
In February 1855 Lord Panmure wrote that what was needed was ‘a proper system for the conveyance of material and baggage [and] the means of easy and immediate transport for sick and wounded’, citing the French example (
The LTC, commanded by the ‘energetic & Intelligent’ Colonel William McMurdo, was thought to be a step in the right direction, but it ‘savoured too strongly of Cavalry’, its officers were thought to be ‘moneyed men’ who were ignorant of their duties, and the other ranks inexperienced and untrained.
The whole organization was described as ‘chaotic’, and there was a chronic shortage of trained personnel such as wheelwrights or carpenters, which accounted for a large number of the vehicles belonging to the LTC being out of commission.
In French military terminology,
Générals Larrey and Percy had first introduced ambulances in the French army in 1793 and it was the latter that created companies of military stretcher-bearers to evacuate the wounded from the battlefield in 1809.
The French system of ambulance mules was systematically and ‘universally admired’ by the British in the Crimea owing to their rapidity of deployment and the comfort they offered the wounded.
British ambulances were manned not by specialist personnel as in the French system, but by a mix of the Hospital Conveyance Corps and men detailed from their regiments, usually the pioneers, bandsmen, and drummers. Each battalion also had a tented field hospital, which was carried on pack mules.
Under the French system, wounded were organized into three classes (
The high praise of the French ambulance mules was due to long-standing admiration of Baron Larrey but, more importantly, because the British army lacked any similar organization. Dr Andrew Smith had designed wheeled ambulances immediately before the outbreak of the war, and a Hospital Conveyance Corps had been raised by the British for service in the Crimea, commanded by Colonel Tulloch. Sadly, it was recruited from ‘superannuated Chelsea Pensioners’ who ‘killed themselves by drinking’ and thus proved an abject failure.
The Inspector General of Hospitals, Dr John Hall, argued for the establishment of an ambulance corps organized and equipped on French lines, and Dr John Wood, surgeon to the 42nd Highlanders, recommended its ‘immediate’ adoption in January 1855.
The
The admiration of the French military system derived from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; there had not been direct emulation of the French. Army reformers also commented on the education and staff work of the French and Prussians, and contrasted it negatively with the perceived lack thereof in Britain (Strachan,
This positive perception of the French army was generated through the thousands of letters home, which were often printed verbatim in local and national newspapers: they ‘confirmed and personalised to a high degree’ the despatches of Russell, Godkin, and others and thus formed the basis of parliamentary and press debates and among the intelligentsia.
Quite simply, Lord Raglan lost the ‘media war’: the despatches of the various ‘Special Correspondents’ were openly hostile to him, and because they often arrived before the official version of events, the press was able to control the flow of information to the public. The newspapers, because of their focus on the winter of 1854 and 1855 and on the reporting of the various committees of inquiry (which also focused on this winter), created the erroneous impression — later to become the central theme or myth of the war — that the British army was in rags and disease-ridden for the duration of the two-year campaign, and certainly worse off than the French, which was not the case (Sweetman,
The official British despatches and the lengthy articles by Russell were also printed in French newspapers, as were letters sent home by French soldiers. Despite French press censorship, Russell’s despatches were printed because of their unstinting praise of the French army and condemnation of the British army. Letters sent home by French troops were more closely scrutinized so as to portray the French army in a positive light, something noted by several British commentators.
Unlike Napoleon III, who banned newspaper correspondents from the front line and only fed them the official despatches and communiqués, the British press went uncensored, with Russell and Godkin having unprecedented access to officers, men, and military statistics (Brown, p. 158). French officers were amazed that the British domestic press was not censured in its discussion of the operations in the Crimea and thought
The more media-savvy French did not air their washing in public and carefully controlled information revealed in official despatches. British officers simply did not trust the ‘official’ French casualty lists and found it almost ‘impossible’ to ascertain accurate figures.
The influence of this often naive positive perception of the French army in the Crimea and the contrast it presented with the British system gave added impetus to the pre-existing British army reform debate. Perception of the competency of the French and the emotional fervour created in favour of the ordinary soldier reinforced the existing notion of the relative inferiority of the British. However, as John Sweetman has indicated, the most significant reforms, including the militarization of the commissariat and break-up of the Board of Ordnance were pre-Crimean War in origin and thus ultimately little affected by the perception or official study of the French army in the war (
Contrasted by the reform-minded press with the apparently successful French
Improved conditions, or at least fewer complaints, during the winter of 1855 and 1856, the apparent reversal in fortunes of the British and French armies, combined with the signing of the Treaty of Paris and the ensuing reduction of the army, were enough to curb the enthusiasm and potential for reform.
In conclusion, admiration for and, more importantly, emulation of the French army support services during and after the Crimean War were short-lived, and based upon a skewed perception of its relative effectiveness compared with the British army. Furthermore, naive praise of the French, and the condemnation of supposed British mishandling of reforms inspired by the French, such as the LTC, were misplaced; the British could not get their version of the French
Miles Hudson and John Stainer,
Richard Glover,
‘The French and German Armies at the Commencement of the Revolution War and at the Present Moment’,
‘An Explanation of the Duties of the Several Etats-Majors in the French Army’,
Hew Strachan,
Henri Ortholan,
Ortholan, pp. 183–88; Lieutenant-Colonel Belhomme,
‘The French Commissariat or Intendance Militaire and the Choice Corps or Companies’,
Capitaine A. J. C. Richard,
John Sweetman,
‘Abuses in the Government of the Army’,
Olive Anderson,
Griffith, pp. 153–54; Richard Holmes,
‘Army Intendance’,
‘Military Organisation’,
Captain Thomas James Thackeray,
Griffith, pp. 163–64; ‘The French Army As It Is’,
Quoted in Lord Panmure,
Royal Warrant, dated 28 October 1858, and Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Existing Organization of Commissariat Dept. (HC Command Papers (1859 session 1) C. (1st series), 2462, pp. 3, 10–11, 12–13.)
Brian Stuart,
‘Rien ne va bien ici jusqu’à ce que vous avez deux gibets mis en place pour la gauche et à droite de votre tente, l’une portant un intendant, et l’autre un officier d’administration’ (Chalmin, p. 282).
‘Oh! sainte paperesse! patronne de l’armée française, providence des intendants, mère nourricière des comptables, désespoir de vrais soldats!’. C-A Thoumas,
Général J. B. A. Montaudon,
‘Pendant toute la campagne, l’intendance continua a percevoir son impôt de papier, et la comptabilité fut aussie méticuleuse qu’en garnison. Pour un bagatelle de nulle valeur, telle qu’une baguette de pistolet, ou un passant d’eterivière, je ne sais combien d’états revetus de plusiers signatures se controlant les unes les autres!’. C. Mismer,
Commandant Devanlay, ‘Lettres de Crimée du général Breton (2ème partie)’,
F. de Marcy, ‘Lettres de campagne du général de division Henrie de Bouillé’,
Camille Rousset,
Devanlay, p. 96; Molènes, pp. 133–34;
Capitaine Minart, ‘Lettres écrites pendant la campagne de Crimée par les frères Charles, Alfred et Édouard Minart’,
Général Lebrun,
Général J. J. G. Cler,
Devanlay, p. 199;
‘Nous ne somme pas constitué ni en état de faire de la guerre […]. On ne fait pas la guerre sans pain, sans souliers, sans marmites et bidons. Je demande pardon à Votre Majesté de ce détails; mais ils prouvent à l’Empereur les difficultés qui assiègent une armée jetée à six cents lieues de ses ressources positives’ (Rousset, I, 83).
La situation de notre armée en orient’,
‘Letter from the Camp’,
General J. B. B. Estcourt, letter to Wetherall, 8 January 1855, London, National Army Museum (NAM), General G. A. Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-95;
General R. Airey, letter to Wetherall, 14 April 1855, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-94; Estcourt, letters to Wetherall, 10 and 15 June 1854, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-95.
N. Kingscote, letter to his father, 15 June 1854, NAM, N. Kingscote MSS, 1973-11-170; Col. J. B. Patullo, letter to his wife, 5 July 1854, Queen’s Lancashire Regiment Museum (QLR), Colonel J. B. Patullo MSS.
General Sir G. Brown, letter to Wetherall, 7 May 1856, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-94.
Ibid. See also, Capt. A. J. Layard, letter to A. H. Layard MP, 29 May 1854, NAM, Captain A. J. Layard MSS, 1959-03-128.
‘The Emperor Louis Napoleon’s New System of Field Artillery’,
Lieutenant Colonel G. Wrottesley,
John Sweetman,
A-J. Vauchelle,
Louis Delpérier and Bertrand Malvaux,
‘Our Troops at Gallipoli’,
Panmure, pp. 286–88; Airey, letter to Wetherall, 29 December 1854, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-94; Estcourt, letter to Wetherall, 28 November 1854, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-95; Brown, letter to Wetherall [n.d.], NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-94.
Estcourt, letter to Wetherall, 13 December 1854, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-95; Lieu. T. Bell, letter to his father, 15 May 1854, NAM, Lieu. T. Bell MSS, 2002-05-2; Patullo, letter to his wife, 23 June 1854, QLR, Patullo MSS; General Sir C. P. Beauchamp Walker,
Wrottesely, II, 154; Lieut.-Colonel Anthony Stirling [Sterling],
Major Claremont, letter to Wetherall, 6 December 1854, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-94; Estcourt, letter to Wetherall, 17 December 1854, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-95.
Estcourt, letter to Wetherall, 13 December 1854, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-95.
HC Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol 3rd Report (HC Paper (1854–55) no. 218, pp. 17–23).
‘The Army before Sebastopol: Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry (Third Day)’,
Estcourt, letters to Wetherall, 28 November 1854, and 8 and 20 January 1855, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-95.
Lord Hardinge, letter to General R. Airey, 4 May 1855, Herefordshire Record Office (HRO), Hereford, Airey MSS, E47/G/IV/A.
Estcourt, letters to Wetherall, 17 December 1854, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-95.
Lord Hardinge, letters to General R. Airey, 5 and 22 January 1855, HRO, Airey MSS, E47/G/IV/A; Wingfield, p. 274.
Wingfield, p. 274; ‘Remarks on the Composition of the Staff’,
John Fortescue,
‘Our Military Reforms of Late Years’, pp. 476–77; Brown, letter to Wetherall, 9 February 1856, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-94.
D-J Larrey,
‘Medical Attendants, &c., for the East’,
Claremont, letter to Wetherall, 12 December 1854, NAM, Wetherall MSS, 1962-10-94; ‘The War’,
Statistical, Sanitary, and Medical Reports of Army Medical Dept.: 1865 (HC Command Papers (1867) C. (1st series), 3911, p. 445).
Panmure, p. 286;
Panmure, p. 286; ‘Heights above Sebastopol, November 6’,
‘The French and English Ambulance Corps’,
Colin Frederick Campbell,
Report on State of Hospitals of British Army in Crimea and Scutari (HC Command Papers (1854–55) C. (1st series), 1920, pp. 55–57).
‘The War’,
Surgeon C. Pine, journal, 3 and 4 January 1855, NAM, Pine MSS, 1968-07-262; ‘Official Documents from the Army in the Crimea’,
L. Legouest,
‘The War’,
‘The Neglect of the Wounded at the Alma’,
Royal Com. to Inquire into Regulations Affecting Sanitary Condition of Army, Organization of Military Hospitals and Treatment of Sick and Wounded (HC Command Papers (1857–58) C. (1st series), 2379, pp. 23, 198).
‘The Army Before Sebastopol’, p. 5; ‘The Army in the Crimea’,
Commandant Joppé, ‘La Campagne de Crimée d’après les lettres du commandant Adrien’,
‘Le 1er régiment de chasseurs d’Afrique à Gallipoli mai 1854’,
‘English Dragoons and their Horses’,
Boppe, pp. 31, 40–41; Paul Verdun and Adrien Morin,
Lieutenant H. Clark, letter to family, 27 December 1855, NAM, 1964-02-33.
Boppe, p. 31; Maréchal Vaillant, ‘Le Ministère de guerre et l’armée de l’orient: rapport de M. le maréchal Vaillant’,
The British didn’t realize the French were having problems. Dr John Hall claimed the French system was working well (Royal Com. to Inquire into Regulations Affecting Sanitary Condition of Army, Organization of Military Hospitals and Treatment of Sick and Wounded, p. 23).
‘An Explanation of the Duties of the Several Etats-Majors in the French Army’, p. 104; ‘Sales by Auction’, [p. 4]; ‘Baron Larrey’,
Stefanie Markovits,
Lucy Brown,
‘Affaires d’orient’,
Colonel Charles Duban,
Edward Spiers,
Spiers,
John Martineau,
Stirling, p. 216; Dickens, p. 74; Kingscote, letters to his father, 9 August 1854 and 18 November 1854, NAM, Kingscote MSS, 1973-11-170; General Sir George Higginson,
Thomas Morris, William Morris, and William Morris, jun.,
Martineau, p. 203; Stirling, p. 216; Patullo, letter to his wife, 23 July 1855, QLR, Patullo MSS; Earle, letter to his father, 4 May 1855, NAM, Earle MSS, 1994-03-153.
Arthur Griffiths,
Sweetman,
‘Military Organisation and Administration of France by Captain Thomas Thackeray’, p. 322.
Lawrence Goldman,
Sweetman,